The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, which erupted on October 8, 2023, has led to a latent yet protracted displacement crisis in Lebanon. What began as limited cross-border hostilities in response to developments in Gaza has evolved into a prolonged war of attrition, gradually escalating in intensity and impact. Despite initial attempts by both parties to maintain certain rules of engagement, the persistence of hostilities has severely affected civilian populations, leading to waves of internal displacement that have compounded Lebanon’s already fragile socio-economic situation. In the early months of the conflict, displacement figures rose steadily, with approximately 45,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) recorded by November 2023. This number more than doubled by August 2024, reaching 113,000. The crisis has affected also host communities, local municipalities, and an overstretched Lebanese government that has struggled to mount an adequate response. Unlike the mass exodus seen during the 2006 war, the one year-long displacement has unfolded in a gradual way, impacting mainly villages and towns located on the border with occupied Palestine. In parallel, the long-lasting conflict led to a generalized anxiety among inhabitants of risky regions – South and Beirut’s southern suburbs –, many of whom decided to move out by precaution, or to preemptively rent alternative housing units in regions perceived as secure. This tendency has affected the housing market, leading to skyrocketing rental prices in many regions across the country. Meanwhile, essential services, including medical assistance, education and food distribution, remained inconsistent, with aid primarily concentrated in collective shelters, leaving many displaced families in host communities under-supported.
The Gaza Spillover and Lebanon’s Displacement Spiral
October 8, 2023, witnessed the unfolding of a new chapter in the long-lasting conflict between Lebanon and the Israeli state. After 17 years of relative calm following the 2006 war between the parties, Hezbollah engaged in a series of attacks against Israeli positions in solidarity with the Palestinians, after the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) retaliatory campaign in the Gaza Strip, which followed the Hamas-led October 7th attacks. Soon, South Lebanon became the theater of a year-long war of attrition with fluctuating intensity. The conflict prompted a severe displacement crisis throughout a significant portion of southern Lebanon.
Since the beginning of the war, both the IDF and Hezbollah claimed to abide by certain rules of engagement which have kept the fighting somewhat contained. However, this could not restrain the development of a humanitarian crisis along both sides of the border. In Lebanon, the conflict forced thousands of southern residents – especially those living in towns and villages along the border lines – to flee the region and seek refuge elsewhere.
According to IOM, the total number of displaced people have reached 5,193 by October 14, increasing sharply by 2,887 IDPs (55.59%) the following day, bringing the total to 8,080 IDPs. Officials have expressed concerns about their limited preparedness for a larger wave of displacement if tensions escalate further. The numerous tit-for-tat attacks along the border, including towns like Adaisseh, Khiam, Ayta al-Shaab and the warnings from UNIFIL about an increase in cross-boundary attacks, have led to a new wave of displacement which increased daily and hit a peak by October 26 with 28,965 IDPs, a rise of 7,847 (37.15%) since October 23, prompting authorities to open 8 designated emergency shelters.
The displacement crisis further intensified with the ongoing attacks, and Lebanese from various sectarian backgrounds have expressed their deep concerns about the potential escalation of daily skirmishes into a devastating war. As of November 14, Lebanon recorded 46,325 internally displaced persons, marking a 76% increase since November 7. The majority of them (30%) have moved to Tyre, where the municipality has reached its maximum capacity in terms of shelters and suffered from a shortage of blankets with the upcoming winter. Despite this, only four collective shelters have been opened hosting only 2% of the overall displaced population, as most displaced have moved to their family’s house (64%), while 27% opted for rental housing units.
During the truce in Gaza that entered into force on November 24, the Lebanese front have witnessed a vigilant calm, despite Lebanon not being a party of the agreement. Some displaced people took the opportunity to return to their homes to check for potential damage or to collect personal belongings. With the ending of the 7 days ceasefire, daily exchanges of rockets, artillery shells and airstrike resumed, triggering a new wave of displacement, with the number of IDPs reaching 72,437 persons by December 19.
The beginning of 2024 started with a slight increase of displaced persons, but the situation stabilized relatively during the first few months of the new year. In this respect, IDP numbers increased by 8% between January 2 and January 9, 2023, reaching 82,012 IDPs. But later, the skirmishes along the southern Lebanese border during the first seven months of the new year decreased, as reported by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project. This has reflected on the displacement trends, with monthly increases of 1 to 2%. By June 25, 2024, Lebanon has recorded 96,829 IDPs, a 2% increase since June 11. By July 23, 2024, the total had risen by 1%, reaching 98,750 IDPs. Data showed that since the beginning of the clashes, more than 60% of border communities in Lebanon had sustained damage due to Israeli air and artillery strikes. By July 10, over 3,200 buildings were reported to have been affected, with Aita el Shaab, Kfar Kila, and Blida being the most affected areas.
The Summer 2024 Escalation
As hostilities persisted into summer 2024, concerns about full-scale war intensified, particularly following the assassination of senior Hezbollah commander Fouad Shukr in late July. The event triggered renewed displacement, bringing the number of IDPs to over 110,000 by mid-August. Even as some residents of southern Lebanon have begun returning to their routines amid Hezbollah’s reassurances of security, the precarious situation maintained a general perception of fear and anxiety.
In a significant escalation in the conflict, Israeli forces killed Fouad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah military commander, in an airstrike in Haret Hreik in the southern suburb of Beirut, on July 31. On the same day, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was also killed in Tehran. Hezbollah vowed to retaliate for the attack, raising fears of a potential regional war and a dangerous spillover to all the region. Amid these heightened tensions and daily exchanges of fire, displacement rates increased by 4% and hit a new record of 102,523 IDPs. The wave of displacement further increased 8% by August 6, and reached a total number of 110,099 by August 13.
Following the assassination of Shukr, tensions simmered for weeks as Hezbollah delayed its retaliation. The eventual response triggered widespread fear, prompting many residents of Dahieh to seek housing elsewhere. The uncertainty also led expatriates to cancel planned visits to Lebanon. This anxiety intensified after Hezbollah's retaliatory attack on August 25, 2024, which involved launching over 340 rockets and drones into northern Israel. In the aftermath, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah delivered a televised speech, urging displaced residents to return home and resume their normal lives.
What started as a limited crisis concerning around 45,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) as of November 2023, has doubled in number and reached 113,000 as of August 2024. Nevertheless, the numbers were still far from that reached during the 2006 war which were estimated to have been around 900,000. The conflict had profound and devastating implications on the IDPs themselves, as well as on the hosting communities and the Lebanese government, as presented in the following paragraphs.
Displacement and Education
Among the most immediate challenges faced by IDPs has been access to education. The Lebanese Ministry of Education implemented emergency measures early in the crisis, attempting to provide alternative schooling solutions. However, these efforts were hampered by the repurposing of schools as shelters, infrastructural damage from Israeli strikes, and logistical constraints.
The education sector was highly impacted by the crisis. On October 10, two days after the beginning of the fights, the caretaker Minister of Education and Higher Education in Lebanon Abbas al-Halabi issued a decision to close schools located in areas adjacent to the southern border. The Ministry consequently launched an educational emergency plan which entailed 10 schools and 10 training centers to ensure the continuation of education in a safe and accessible way. The minister also urged students to enroll in schools in the areas they have fled to. But these efforts were hindered by many factors. Several schools – mostly around Tyre – were transformed to public shelters, while others have been severely damaged by Israeli shelling.
Displacement and Syrian Refugees
Compounding the crisis is the Lebanese government’s policy toward displaced Syrian refugees. Authorities have actively restricted their access to public services, citing concerns that they would not leave once stability is restored. While international organizations such as UNHCR and UNRWA have stepped in to provide support, the lack of a coordinated state response has left many without adequate assistance.
Regarding Syrian refugees the Lebanese government has decided to not welcome them in schools and in state institutions under the pretext that “they will not leave when the situation returns to normal”. Additionally, some municipalities in the Bekaa and the South have imposed restrictions on Syrian refugees, redirecting services to Lebanese citizen, and preventing organizations from helping them. There was no official data on the displacement of Syrian refugees in Lebanon as around 80 thousands of them were located in the South, the government response was focused on its citizens leaving the responsibility of addressing the crisis of other nationalities to international organizations. In this regard, UNRWA has opened 16 schools as shelters and UNHCR is working on a response plan to meet the needs of Syrian refugees.
An Insufficient Response
Eleven months of sustained conflict have not only reshaped the landscape of displacement but also exposed Lebanon’s limited capacity to manage prolonged crises, raising alarm over the potential humanitarian fallout should further escalation occur.
Lebanese authorities attempted vainly to become a proactive actor in the shaping of the conflict and its various outcomes. One of the attempts was the Lebanese government’s paper outlining the rules for long-term stability in southern Lebanon, urging both sides to abide by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006). Another attempt was concretized through the Government’s Emergency Plan developed to prepare for an all-out war. The plan focused on four key aspects: health, shelter, food, water and sanitation. Regarding shelter, which was the main topic, areas were categorized geographically based on the level of risk they might pose. Each area would have its own mechanism to respond to the displacement of people. The emergency plan was based on an estimated number of displaced people that could reach 1.5 million. The authorities were also coordinating with international organizations and established a mechanism for coordination to respond to the emergency plan. Meanwhile, the caretaker social affairs minister has called for urgent international support in order to help the government manage the growing numbers of IDPs.
Moreover, many NGOs also seemed to be prepared to the crisis, like UNRWA which developed an emergency plan to address the possibility of war in Lebanon. The agency has stockpiled medical supplies and fuel, and renovated several of its facilities, including schools, to serve as shelter centers if needed.
This is not the first displacement crisis for the southern people, as many endured a similar situation during the 2006 war. In response to that experience, the Union of Tyre Municipalities established a disaster management unit in 2010 aiming to handle and manage any potential crises. During the crisis, this unit has started to manage the situation by opening shelters, distributing foods and medical supplies, and meeting the needs of IDPs. In Tyre, more than 1,500 IDPs have been distributed across the public and private schools. Many of them were reported facing dire living conditions, with several families sharing a single bathroom and electricity and water being frequently unavailable.
In parallel, residents across the district of Tyre have opened their homes to host the displaced people showing social solidarity with them while some Lebanese citizens have raised slogan “If there aren't enough homes to accommodate the people of the South, we will find space for them in our hearts.” But on the other side, there was another message “You are not welcome in our region” which reflected the deep political and sectarian divisions in the country.
Nevertheless, rent prices in Beirut and its suburbs have tripled, exploiting the needs of displaced families. Many displaced people were struggling with a lack of food and its quality, inadequate heating in the cold weather, and the absence of medical assistance. Aid distribution was limited to those in shelters, leaving displaced families outside of shelters without sufficient support. Some places rental prices increased drastically. Public Works documented these price changes across some regions.
Eleven Months of Displacement in Numbers
Between October 8, 2023 and August 27, 2024, and just before the conflict’s escalation of September, the numbers, as published by the IOM Mobility Snapshot – Round 44 were the following:
- The number of IDPs has increased to 113,729.
- 51% of the IDPs were female while 49% were male.
- Only 1% (1,248) of IDPs sought refuge in collective shelters, while 78% resorted to host settings, and 19% opted for rental units.
- 24 out of the 26 Districts across all 8 Governorates were concerned by the displacement crisis.
- 72% of the IDPs sought refuge in 5 districts: Tyre (25%), Nabatieh (18%), Baabda (11%), Saida (10%) and Beirut (7%).
- Most of IDPs left from the Cazas of Bent Jbeil (68%), Marjaayoun (14%) and Tyre (12%).
- 63% of displacement occurred outside the boundaries of the IDP’s governorate of origin (cross-governorate displacement) – the most being in the Nabatieh Governorate – while 37% occurred within the IDP’s governorate of origin (intra-governorate displacement) – the most being in the South governorate.
- Only 80 cases of returnees were recorded, all being from Tyre District.